We give an exponential lower bound on number of proof-lines in the proof system K of modal logic, i.e., we give an example of K-tautologies ψ1, ψ2, . . . s.t. every K-proof of ψi must have a number of proof-lines exponential in terms of the size of ψi. The result extends, for the same sequence of K-tautologies, to the systems K4, Gödel-L"ob's logic, S and S4. We also determine some speed-up relations between different systems of modal logic on formulas of modal-depth one.
Introduction
The object of proof complexity is to determine how efficient various proof systems are in proving their theorems. This leads to the basic problem of finding lower bounds on sizes of proofs in the systems, which can be formulated as follows:
For a proof system Q and a function g : ω → ω find (or decide whether it exists) a sequence of Q-tautologies ψ 1 , ψ 2 , . . . such that for every i ∈ ω every Q-proof of ψ i must have size at least g(|ψ i |).
1
The answer to the problem, as well as its importance, will of course depend on the particular system Q and function g. For example, in the case of predicate calculus the problem has an affirmative solution for any recursive function g, and the lower bounds are even more radical if Q contains some arithmetic. In the case of weak proof systems, like propositional calculus, the problem is more subtle and much more difficult. For such systems, the question is to find an exponential (or at least superpolynomial) lower bound. Until now, such a lower bound has been proved only for artificial proof systems, namely resolution and Frege systems of bounded depth. The difficulty of the problem has the same reason which makes it particularly interesting: its connection to computational complexity and the question whether N P = coN P (resp. P SP ACE = coN P .) By the theorem of Cook and Reckhow, if we show that every propositional system has a superpolynomial lower bound then N P = coN P .
The proof system
In the main part of the paper we construct an exponential lower bound for the system of modal logic K. The system is obtained by adding the symbol for necessity, 2, to propositional logic. Propositional logic is assumed to be formalised by the usual rules and axioms, having the general form of Frege rules. More precisely, a Frege rule is the rule
where the formulas ψ 1 , . . . ψ k , ξ are propositional formulas (i.e., not containing 2) s.t. every truth assignement of the propositional variables which satisfies all of ψ 1 (p), . . . ψ k (p) satisfies also ξ(p). An application of the rule is a substitution of formulas for the variables p, the substituted formulas being arbitrary modal formulas. The specific set of Frege rules chosen will not affect the proof of lower bound. In addition, K has the rule of generalisation ψ 2ψ , and the axiom of distributivity 2(ψ → ξ) → (2ψ → 2ξ).
The distributivity axiom has the key role in constructing the lower bound. In fact, we will show that every proof of the given tautology requires an exponential number of applications of the distributivity axiom in K. The other proof systems to which the result applies are extensions of K by other modal axioms, which will be specified in Section 6. The same lower bound is valid also in the case of K4, Gödel-Löb's logic, S and S4, by showing that the additional axioms do not lead to shortening of proofs on tautologies of modal depth one (as far as the number of distributivity axioms is concerned). The result does not apply to K5 and S5. In this case, it is shown that K5 and S5 have exponential speed-up over K on tautologies of modal-depth one (see Section 6.6). A recent application of the lower bound for K is a lower bound on the lengths of proofs in intuitionistic propositional logic, which will be given elsewhere. All the logics to which the result applies are P SP ACE-complete, while we are short of proving the same for K5 or S5 which are in N P . However, this is a mere coincidence. The hard tautologies which will be presented are tautologies of modal depth one. But the system K restricted only to formulas of modal depth one is also N P -complete.
The method of proof
The general strategy of the proof is the following: as we are not attempting to find lower bounds for Frege systems, we shall count only the applications of modal axioms in a proof. In fact, we will consider only the number of axioms of distributivity in a proof. In order to be able to find a lower bound on the number of applications of distributivity in a K-proof, we will work in the theory K 0 5 (introduced on page 4) which does not contain the distributivity axiom. We show that if Γ is the set of distributivity axioms used in K-proof of ψ then Γ → ψ is a K 0 5 -tautology. Hence, in order to show that n is a lower bound on the number of applications of distributivity in a proof of ψ, it is sufficient to show that for every set Γ of distributivity axioms s.t. |Γ| < n, Γ → ψ is not K we interpret 2 over a set G, which is a set of sets of truth assignments. Distributivity axioms impose G to be closed on intersections and supersets, i.e., they require G to be a filter. In order to find a model in which Γ → ψ is false, it is sufficient to find G which looks like a filter enough to make the axioms in Γ true without making true ψ. It should be observed that the model construction is intimately related to Karchmer's formulation of the Razborov proof of lower bound on monotone circuit size, see [3] .
2 (However, the proof was obtained without knowing Karchmer's approach.)
Monotone interpolation
The bound itself is not reached directly, but rather by showing that K has a form of monotone interpolation. The idea of monotone interpolation is to apply the seminal results in circuit complexity of Razborov [5] , and Alon-Boppana [1] and others, to proof-complexity. Alon and Boppana have shown that every monotone circuit C (i.e., a circuit which contains only ∧-gates, ∨-gates and no ¬-gates) which separates the set of k +1-colorable graphs, Color k+1 , and graphs with clique of size k, Clique k , (i.e., it is a circuit which outputs 1, if the graph is k + 1-colorable, 0, if the graph has k-clique, and anything if neither applies) must be of exponential size. The implication ( ) "if a graph has a clique of size k + 1 then it is not k-colorable" can be formulated as a propositional tautology. Hence in order to find an exponential lower bound for a propositional proof system P , it is sufficient to show that from a P -proof of ( ) of size n one can extract a monotone circuit of size polynomial in n separating Color k+1 and Clique k . This approach has been first applied by Krajíček [4] to obtain a lower bound for resolution. In the case of K, we rephrase ( ) by inserting 2 here and there to obtain a modal tautology (see Theorem 14 for the exact formulation), and we show that every K-proof of the modified ( ) with n distributivity axioms gives a monotone circuit separating Color k+1 and Clique k of size approximately n 2 . This is achieved by representing the model-theoretic content of distributivity axioms used in a proof by a so called flowgraph, and by observing that flowgraphs can be simulated by monotone circuits.
As remarked above, the proof of monotone interpolation for K employs the same general approach as the proof of monotone lower bound for circuits. The proof could hence be carried out directly, by repeating the proof of Alon and Boppana, without an explicit reference to it.
I worked on the problem of lower bounds for modal logic with Pavel Pudlák and Joost Joosten, to whom I am thankful for introducing me to the problematics as well as for invaluable help.
Theory
The theory K 0 5 will have, in addition to the propositional rules, the rules of generalisation and transparency
and the axiom scheme
The axiom scheme expresses the K5 property that modalised formulas have truth-values independent on a possible world -thence the notation K Proof. Assume, for simplicity, that ψ = 2ξ and that there is a propositional formula η s.t. every 2 occurring in ξ occurs as 2η. ξ is, by means of propositional rules only, equivalent to
for some propositional formulas λ 1 , λ 2 . By transparency
3 Note that we cannot use the usual K5 formulation because we do not have distributivity.
Hence, by (V ),
where (2λ 1 ∧ 2η) ∨ (2λ 2 ∧ ¬2η) has modal-depth one. The general proof is carried out easily by induction. QED
Models for
Let U denote the set of all possible truth assignments of propositional variables (i.e., U is infinite). Let G ⊆ P (U ) be fixed. For v ∈ U and a modal formula ψ we define that v ψ by induction as follows:
2. We let v ψ 1 ∧ ψ 2 iff v ψ 1 and v ψ 2 . We let v ¬ψ iff not v ψ, and similarly for other connectives.
3. Finally, assume that the relation u ψ has been defined for any u ∈ U . Let [ψ] := {u ∈ U ; u ψ} .
(The requirement U ∈ G corresponds to the rule of generalisation.) We write that v, G |= ψ, if v ψ. Note that if every variable in ψ occurs only in modal context (for such a formula we say it is purely modal ), the fact whether v, G |= ψ is independent on v and we may also write simply G |= ψ. Proof. The soundness part is easy. For the completeness part it is sufficient to prove that for every consistent formula ψ (i.e., K 0 5 ψ) there exists a model M s.t. M |= ψ. STEP 1. By Proposition 1 we can assume that ψ has modal-depth one. STEP 2. Let r 1 , . . . r n be the list of variables which occur in ψ in nonmodal context. For an assignment σ of the variables r 1 , . . . r n , let ψ σ denote the formula obtained by replacing every non-modal occurrence of r i by σ(r i ), i = 1, . . . n. Since ordinary propositional rules are in K 0 5 , there exists some assignment σ s.t. ψ σ is consistent. Clearly, if we have G s.t. G |= ψ σ then σ, G |= ψ. Therefore we can assume that ψ is a purely modal formula. STEP 3. Assume that ψ is a purely modal formula of modal depth one. By means of propositional logic only, we can transform it to an equivalent DNF formula, i.e. a formula which is a disjunction of formulas of the form
Since ψ is consistent then at least one of the disjuncts is consistent. For such a disjunct η of the depicted form, we let
In the former case ξ i is a propositional tautology and in the latter K 2ψ i → 2ξ j , which contradicts the assumption that η is consistent. QED
An approach to lower bounds
The theory K is the theory which, in addition to the propositional rules, has a) the rule of generalisation, and b) the axiom of distributivity
Proposition 3 Let ψ be K-tautology.
(1) Let Γ be the set of distributivity axioms occurring in a proof of ψ. Then
(2) Assume that for every set Γ of distributivity axioms s.t. |Γ| < k, the formula Γ → ψ is not a K 
Let S be the proof of ψ. It is sufficient to prove by induction that for every u ∈ U and a formula η in S, u η. Consider the possible alternatives. a) For an axiom of propositional logic the statement holds, and an application of a propositional rule retains the property. b) An element of Γ is true in M by the assumption. Since distributivity axioms are purely modal formulas then they are true in every u ∈ U as well. c) Assume that generalisation is applied to ψ. By the assumption, for every u ∈ U , u ψ. Hence [ψ] = U and therefore G |= 2ψ. d) Similarly for the transparency rule.
(2) trivially follows. QED
tautology then in general we need two distributivity axioms to prove 2ψ ≡ 2ξ in K. But those distributivity axioms, as following straight from the transparency rule, will be omitted in Proposition 3.
In terms of G, distributivity axiom corresponds to the condition
will be called a set of distributivity conditions. We shall say that G is distributive on Λ iff every X, Y ∈ Λ satisfies the condition ( ). If Γ is a set of distributivity axioms of modal depth one, the set of corresponding conditions Λ is defined as follows: for every distributivity axiom of the form
Remark. Note that the condition ( ) can be replaced by an equivalent pair of conditions of the form
Hence distributivity axioms can be seen as requiring G to be a filter. In our lower-bound we shall construct G which is a filter enough to satisfy the distributivity axioms used in a (hypothetical) proof of a tautology ψ without making ψ true. If we demand G to be distributive on the whole P (U ) 2 then G is a filter. Restricting U to a set U p of assignments of a finite set of variables p then U p is finite and G restricted to U p is a trivial filter, i.e., generated by a single set
The following is a simple but nevertheless a very important lemma:
Lemma 4 For a formula η, let η denote the formula obtained by deleting all boxes in η. Furthermore, let η be the formula obtained by deleting every 2 in η which is in a range of another box. Then:
(1) If ψ is K-tautology then ψ is a propositional tautology.
(2) If ψ is K-tautology then ψ is K-tautology. Moreover, if ψ has K-proof S with n distributivity axioms then ψ has K-proof S s.t. i) S contains at most n distributivity axioms and ii) all formulas in S have modal-depth one.
Proof. (1) is clear.
(2) Let S = η 1 . . . η n , η n = ψ, be K-proof of ψ and let Γ be the set of distributivity axioms occurring in S. We see that if η is an axiom of distributivity then η is also such. Hence Γ := {γ ; γ ∈ Γ} is also a set of distributivity axioms. Let S = η 1 . . . η n . We must show by induction that every η i , i = 1, . . . n, is provable in K by a proof with formulas of modal depth one using just the distributivity axioms in Γ . Clearly, the only non-trivial step is when η j is obtained from η i , i < j by generalisation. Assume then that η j = 2η i has been obtained as
We have (η j ) = (2(η i ) ) = 2η i . Since η i is K-tautology then by part (1) η i is a propositional tautology. Therefore we can prove 2η i first by proving η i , using just propositional rules, and then applying generalisation
Hence no distributivity is needed to prove 2η i = (η j ) . QED Proposition 5 Let ψ be a K-tautology of modal depth one. Assume that it has K-proof S with n distributivity axioms. Then ψ has a K-proof S s.t. i) S contains n distributivity axioms ii) all the distributivity axioms in S have modal depth one.
Proof. Immediately follows from the previous lemma. QED
The following is then an easy consequence of Proposition 3:
Theorem 6 Let ψ be a K-tautology of modal depth one. Assume that for every set of distributivity conditions Λ s.t |Λ| < k there exists G distributive on Λ and a corresponding model s.t. v, G |= ψ. Then every K proof of ψ contains at least k axioms of distributivity.
Proof. Assume the contrary. Then we have a K-proof S of ψ with less than k axioms of distributivity. By the previous proposition, we can assume that all the formulas in ψ, and hence also the distributivity axioms, have modal-depth one. Let Λ be the set of conditions corresponding to Γ, the distributivity axioms in S.
By the assumption, we can find v, G s.t. G is distributive on Λ and v, G |= ψ. But hence v, G |= Γ and v, G |= Γ → ψ which contradicts Proposition 3. QED
Monotone interpolation for K
For a propositional formula α(p, r), α(2p, r) will denote the formula obtained from α by replacing all variables p ∈ p by 2p. A modality-free formula α will be called monotone, if the only logical connectives occurring in α are ∧ and ∨. If we have a monotone formula α containing exactly the variables p and a modality-free formula β s.t. α → β is a tautology then also
is a modal tautology. The obvious strategy for proving ( ) is to start with the atoms of α and then expand the boxes in α upwards by changing 2ψ 1 ∧ 2ψ 2 resp. 2ψ 1 ∨2ψ 2 to 2(ψ 1 ∧ψ 2 ) resp. 2(ψ 1 ∨ψ 2 ). Hence we have obtained 2α and we proceed by one application of distributivity on 2(α → β). In this way, we needed at least as many distributivity axioms as there are connectives in α (when the circuit size of α is considered.) This process could be made -with respect to the distributivity axioms -more efficient if we first transformed α(2p) to a formula of a smaller monotone circuit size by means of pure propositional logic and applied the described procedure to the simplified formula. For example, we can transform α(2p) either to a CNF or a DNF form which may have very different sizes. We will now prove that such a strategy is the most efficient in proving the implication, that any proof of ( ) contains at least as many axioms of distributivity as is the size of the smallest monotone interpolant of α and β.
We shall say that a circuit C(p) interpolates α(p) and β(p, r) iff for any assignment σ of p The size of a circuit is the number of its gates.
It is easy to show that if there is a monotone interpolant of α and β of size n, then α(2p) → 2β has a proof with o(n) distributivity axioms. We are now going to prove the following:
Theorem 7 Let α be a monotone formula containing exactly the variables p and let β be a modality-free formula. Assume that
has an K proof with n distributivity axioms. Then there is a monotone circuit of size ≤ o(n 2 ) which interpolates α and β.
Note: we do not restrict the variables occurring in β in any way.
We first introduce some concepts:
Flowgraphs
A flowgraph M is a directed labeled graph with the following properties:
1. The labels of vertices are unique and some vertices are labeled by variables p 1 , . . . p n and the constant 1.
2. for every edge a, b in M there exists a vertex a s.t. a , b is also an edge in M and both the edges are labeled ∧{a, a }. Such a pair will be called a ∧-gate and we shall write that b = a ∧ a .
A flowgraph will be called acyclic, if the underlying graph is acyclic. The size of M will be the number of gates in M . The construction proceeds as follows: let M have k vertices a 1 , . . . a k and n gates (so k ≤ 2n, as we can assume that there are no isolated vertices in M .) For every vertex a j j = 1, . . . k, we introduce k copies a Finally, we identify vertices the vertex a = a j of M with its copy a k j in M . It is easy to see that M simulates M on a. The size of M is n.k ∼ o(n 2 ). STEP 2. Second, it is sufficient to prove that for an acyclic flowgraph M of size n and a vertex a of M there is a monotone circuit C a of the desired properties of size 2n. The above construction automatically gives a flowgraph s.t. every node labelled by a p or 1 is a leaf and we shall assume also this property in M . To a leaf which is labeled by a variable p or 1 assign the circuit p resp. 1 and to a leaf of a different kind an empty circuit. Assume that for a vertex b we have assigned circuits to source nodes of all gates with an output node b. 
Flowgraphs for distributivity axioms.
For a set Γ of distributivity axioms of modal-depth one let Λ ⊆ P (U ) 2 be the corresponding set of distributivity conditions (see page 7). A flowgraph for Λ (or Γ) is a flowgraph whose vertices are labeled by subsets of U and defined as follows: The following two lemmas give the key properties of flowgraphs for distributivity axioms.
Lemma 9 Let Λ be a set of conditions and M a flowgraph for Λ. Let ψ be a modality-free formula. Assume that a vertex in M is labeled by [ψ] . Let σ be an assignement of p and assume that
Proof. Straight from the definition. QED Lemma 10 Let Λ be a set of conditions and M a flowgraph for Λ. Let ψ be a modality-free formula. Assume that a vertex in M is labeled by [ψ] . Let σ be an assignement of p and assume that V σ ([ψ]) = 0. Then there exists G distributive on Λ s.t. G |= 2p i , for every p i s.t. σ(p i ) = 1, and G |= 2ψ.
Proof. It is sufficient to define
Note that by virtue of Lemma 9, in Lemma 10 we have that also G |= ¬2p i , if σ(p i ) = 0.
Proof of Theorem 7.
Let Γ be the set of distributivity axioms used in the proof of
Let |Γ| = n. By Proposition 5 we can assume that formulas in Γ are of modal depth one. Let Λ be the corresponding set of conditions. Then |Λ| ≤ n. Let M be the flowgraph for Λ. Again, the size of the flowgraph is ≤ n. We can assume that there is a vertex in M labeled [β], otherwise no distributivity has been applied to β in the proof, β is a propositional tautology and the statement is trivial. By the Proposition 8 we can find a monotone circuit C of size ≤ o(n 2 ) s.t. for any assignement σ
Let us show that C interpolates α and β. Let σ be an assignement s.t. α(σ(p)) is true. Assume that C(σ(p)) = 0. Then also V σ ([β]) = 0 and so by Lemma 10 we can find a model G s.t. G |= Γ, G |= 2β and for every p i , if
is a K-tautology. But hence also
is a propositional tautology. Therefore β(σ(p), r) is a propositional tautology and satisfied by any assignement of r.
Hence C interpolates α and β. QED
A generalisation of Theorem 7
For the purpose of a later reference we state here a generalisation of Theorem 7. The proposition will not be used elsewhere in this paper.
Proposition 11 Let α, β 1 and β 2 be propositional formulas. Assume that α is a monotone formula and that it contains exactly the variables p, and that β 1 resp. β 2 contain variables p, s 1 resp p, s 2 . Assume that
has a K-proof with n distributivity axioms. Then there exist monotone circuits
if C 1 (p) = 1 then β 1 is true (for any assignement of the variables s 1 ), and if C 2 (p) = 1 then β 2 is true (for any assignement of the variables s 2 ).
Proof. The proof is a straightforward generalisation of the proof of Theorem 7. Part (1) follows from Lemma 9 and part (2) from Lemma 10. QED A different modification of Theorem 7 could be obtained by weakening the monotonicity assumption of α. The monotonicity requirement demands that neither ¬2p nor 2¬p occur in α. However, no substantial modification of the proof would be required if the later assumption was dropped. In that case of course, the circuit obtained would no longer be monotone.
The hard tautology
A propositional formula α in variables p, r will be called monotone in p, if the formula when transformed to a DNF form does not contain a negation of any variable in p.
For a propositional formula ψ(p, r), r ψ(p, r) will denote the disjunction of all formulas of the form ψ(p, σ(r)), where σ is an assignement of the variables r.
Lemma 12 Let ψ be K-tautology and let the variables r = r 1 , . . . r j not occur in ψ in a modal context. Assume that ψ has a K-proof S with n distributivity axioms. Then there exists a K-proof S of ψ with n distributivity axioms s.t. the variables r do not occur in S in a modal context.
Proof. Let S = ψ 1 , . . . ψ k , where ψ k = ψ. Let the set of distributivity axioms in S be Γ, |Γ| = n. Let q = q 1 , . . . q j be a set of auxiliary variables. For a formula η, let η denote the formula obtained by replacing the modalised occurrences of variables r by q in the respective order. Hence ψ = ψ. Let Γ := {γ , γ ∈ Γ}.
It should be proved by induction with respect to i, i = 1, . . . k, that ψ i has K-proof S i s.t. a) the variables r do not occur in S i in a modal context and b) all distributivity axioms in the proof are elements of Γ . Clearly, the only non-trivial steps are when ψ i was obtained from ψ l , l < i, by generalisation rule. Assume that ψ i = 2ψ l was obtained as
Assume that ψ l has a proof S l of the desired properties. Let us show that also ψ i = (2ψ l ) has such a proof. Let η := ψ l (r/q). Then ψ i = 2η. Let T be the proof obtained by replacing r by q in S i . Hence T is a proof of η with no occurrence of r ∈ r and therefore with all distributivity axioms in Γ . The proof S i of ψ i = 2η can then be obtained by adding generalisation η 2η
to T . QED Theorem 13 Let α(p, r) be a monotone formula in p and let β(p, s) be a propositional formula.
(
is provable in K with n distributivity axioms. Then there exists a monotone circuit of size o(n 2 ) which interpolates r α(p, r) and β(p, s).
Proof.
(1) Clearly, it is sufficient to prove that for every assignement σ of variables r, α(2p, σ(r)) → 2β is a K-tautology. Hence it is sufficient to prove that if α is a monotone formula and α → β is a propositional tautology then also
is a K-tautology. But that has been explained on page 9.
(2) Let γ(p) := r α(p, r). Let us show that γ and β have an interpolant C of size o(n 2 ). By Theorem 7, it is sufficient to prove that
has a proof with at most n axioms of distributivity.
Let S be a proof of α(2p, r) → 2β(p, s) and Γ the set of distributivity axioms occurring in it, |Γ| = n. By the previous Lemma we can assume that the variables r do not occur in Γ. For an assignement σ of r, let S σ denote the proof obtained by replacing r by σ(r) in S. Then for any such σ, S σ is a proof of α(2p, σ(r)) → 2β(p, s) and all the distributivity axioms it contains are in Γ (for elements of Γ do not contain r). All the proofs S σ can be joint to a proof of γ(2p) → 2β(p, s).
The set of distributivity axioms in the proof is again Γ. QED
where the indeces i range over 1, . . . n and j over 1, . . . k.
Theorem 14 Let
Proof. Assume that Θ k n has a K-proof with m distributivity axioms. By the previous lemma, there is a monotone interpolant C of r Clique k n (p, r) and ¬Color k n (p, s) of size o(m 2 ). By [1] , every such circuit has size at least 2
Remark. A hard tautology of quite a different form could be obtained from the following proposition (which is an immediate corollary of Theorem 7): Assume that α(p) is a modality-free formula which defines a monotone Boolean function f (but α is not necessarily monotone itself ). Then
is a K-tautology. If ( ) has a proof in K with n axioms of distributivity then there exists a monotone circuit of size o(n 2 ) computing f .
This proposition would give us a lower-bound, had we had an example of a monotone function f such that i) f is defined by a small Boolean formula ii) every monotone circuit which defines f must be large. However, by introducing new variables for gates of C, we can express also the proposition C(2p) → 2C(p), where C is a circuit. Such a modified tautology gives a lower bound if we have monotone f such that i) f is defined by a small Boolean circuit ii) every monotone circuit which defines f is large. Examples of such functions are well-known.
6 Applications to other modal systems.
In this section we prove that the tautology given in Theorem 14 is a hard tautology also in the systems of modal logic K4, Gödel-Löb's logic, S and S4. For K5 (and hence S5) this is probably not the case and we show that there is an exponentialm speed-up between K5 and K on tautologies of modal-depth one.
The system K4
K4 is the system K plus the axiom 2ψ → 22ψ.
The application to K4 is immediate:
Theorem 15 Let ψ be a K-tautology of modal depth one. Assume that ψ has a proof in K4 with n axioms of distributivity. Then ψ has a proof in K with at most n axioms of distributivity.
Proof. It is easy to show that Lemma 4 is true also in the case of K4. The point is that
is a propositional tautology. We thus obtain K4-proof with at most n distributivity axioms and formulas of modal depth one, i.e., a K-proof. QED Corollary Let Θ k n be the tautology of Theorem 14, for the same choice of k. Then every K4 proof of Θ k n contains an exponential number of distributivity axioms.
The following lemma will be used in the proof of Theorem 19. We shall say that an axiom of distributivity of the form 2(ψ → ξ) → (2ψ → 2ξ) is a proper axiom of distrivutivity, if K 0 5 ψ ≡ ξ. As remarked on page 3, the bound of Theorem 14 applies when only the number of proper distributivity axioms is considered.
Lemma 16 Let K4
+ be the logic K4 plus the axiom 2ψ → 2(ψ ∧ 2ψ).
Let ψ be K-tautology of modal depth one. Assume that ψ has a proof in K4 + with n axioms of distributivity. Then ψ has a proof in K with at most n proper axioms of distributivity.
Proof. The proof is parallel to the proof of Theorem 15. The only modification is that
But ψ ≡ ψ ∧ ψ is a propositional tautology and hence no proper distributivity axiom is required. QED
Remark. The argument of the proof of Theorem 15 can be applied to the system K4 plus the axiom 22ψ → 2ψ.
Gödel -Löb's logic
GL is the system K4 plus the Löb axiom
Theorem 17 Let ψ be K-tautology of modal depth one. Assume that ψ has a proof in GL with n axioms of distributivity. Then ψ has a proof in K with at most n proper axioms of distributivity.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 4. Let η be defined as follows: for every subformula of η of the form 2ξ which is not in a range of further modality, replace 2ξ by 1. Claim. Assume that GL ψ. Then ψ is a propositional tautology.
The claim is proved easily by induction: the K4 axiom and Löb axiom change to 1 → 1, distributivity to 1 → (1 → 1) and generalisation to η 1 .
Let η be defined as follows: for every subformula of η of the form 2ξ which is not in a range of further modality, replace 2ξ by 2ξ . We can see that if η is a distributivity axiom then η is a distributivity axiom. Again, we can show that if S = η 1 . . . η k is GL-proof of ψ and Γ is the set of distributivity axioms in S, then every η i , i = 1, . . . k, is provable in K using just distributivity from Γ := {γ ; γ ∈ Γ}. The K4 axiom changes to 2ψ → 21, which is provable in K without using any distributivity, and Löb axiom becomes Remark. The argument of the proof applies also to the system K4 plus the axiom 22ψ ∨ 2¬2ψ.
This is interesting because this system together with the axiom from the previous remark is equivalent to K5 for which the lower-bound does not work.
S, S4
S resp. S4 is the logic K resp. K4 plus the axiom 2ψ → ψ.
As will be shown in Theorem 22 there is an exponential speed-up between S and K. However, in the case of monotone formulas such as the ones needed in the lower bound there is indeed no speed-up between S and K (as far as the number of distributivity axioms is concerned).
For a formula ψ of modal-depth one, ψ s will be the usual translation of S to K, i.e. p s := p, (ψ 1 ∧ ψ 2 ) s := ψ 1 s ∧ ψ 2 s and similarly for other connectives, and mainly (2ψ)
Lemma 18 Let ψ be S-tautology of modal-depth one. Then ψ s is K-tautology. Furthermore, if ψ has a S-proof resp. S4 proof with n distributivity axioms then ψ s has a K-proof with at most n distributivity axioms resp. n proper distributivity axioms.
Proof. Straightforward. QED
Theorem 19 Let α(p 1 , . . . p n , r) be a monotone formula in p 1 , . . . p n . Let
Then if Θ has a S-proof resp. S4 proof with n distributivity axioms then Θ has K-proof with at most n distributivity axioms resp. n proper distributivity axioms.
Proof. We will prove the proposition for S, the part for S4 follows similarly from the previous Lemma and Lemma 16.
Assume that Θ has S-proof with n distributivity axioms. Then Θ 1 := Θ s has K-proof with at most n distributivity axioms,
Hence also
has a K-proof with at most n distributivity axioms. Substituting throughout the proof 2p i for p i , i = 1, . . . n, we obtain that also
has a K proof with at most n distributivity axioms. By Lemma 4, the formula Θ 3 is K-tautology and has a K-proof with at most n distributivity axioms. However,
Hence Θ 3 is equivalent to Θ using just propositional rules. Therefore Θ has K-proof with at most n distributivity axioms. QED Corollary Let Θ k n be the tautology of Theorem 14, for the same choice of k. Then every S resp. S4 proof of Θ k n contains an exponential number of distributivity axioms.
K5 and some speed-up relations
The theory K5 is the theory K4 plus the axiom ¬2ψ → 2¬2ψ.
The result of Theorem 14 does not apply to K5 (and hence to S5). It can be shown that the tautology of the Theorem a) requires only a polynomial number of distributivity axioms in K5 and b) it has a polynomial-size proof assuming that certain classical tautologies have poly-size Frege proofs. The same applies to the hard tautology mentioned in Remark on page 16. Those observations will be left without a proof here. We will rather prove that a variant of the tautology of Theorem 14 has a polynomial-size proof in K5. Since this variant has only exponetial proofs in K or K4, this implies that there is an exponential speed-up between K5 and K resp. K4 on tautologies of modal-depth one.
Lemma 20 Let ψ be a K-tautology of modal depth one. Assume that the variables r do not occur in ψ in a modal context. Assume that ψ(2r) has a K-proof with n distributivity axioms. Then ψ has a K-proof with at most n distributivity axioms.
Proof. Let ξ(r/1) be an abbreviation for ξ(r 1 /1, . . . r k /1) for r = r 1 , . . . r k . For a formula η of modal depth one, let η denote the formula obtained by replacing every 2ξ by 2ξ(r/1) ∧ ξ(r).
Let S = η 1 , . . . η m , η m = ψ be the proof of ψ(2r). By Lemma 4 we can assume that the proof of ψ contains only formulas of modal depth one. As in Lemma 4 we can easily show that η m = (ψ(2r)) is provable in K using n distributivity axioms. However, (2r i ) = 21 ∧ r i and 21 is provable only using generalisation, and hence (2r i ) ≡ r i is provable using no distributivity rule. Hence also the equivalence (ψ(2r)) ≡ ψ(r)
is provable with no distributivity axioms. Altogether, ψ is provable with n distributivity axioms. QED
Theorem 21
There exists a K-tautology Θ of modal depth one s.t. every Kproof of Θ contains exponential number of proof-lines, but Θ has a polynomialsize proof in K5.
Proof. Let Θ be the tautology The importance of the Theorem 21 lies in the fact that it gives speed-up on formulas of modal-depth one. A speed-up on formulas of modal-depth one can be obtained also between S on the one hand, and the systems K, K4 and Gödel-Löb's logic on the other. The same trick can probably be applied to show speed-up relations between the other systems on general modal formulas.
Theorem 22 Let P be K, K4, or Gödel-Löb's logic. Then S has an exponential speed-up over P on formulas of modal-depth one. More exactly, there exists a sequence of formulas provable both in P and S s.t. they have linear-size proofs in S but every proof in P must be exponential.
Proof. We know that there exists a sequence of K-tautologies ψ 1 , ψ 2 , ψ 3 , . . . which have only exponential-size proofs in P . Let λ be the formula 2p → p, for a variable p not occurring in ψ i , i = 1, 2, . . .. Let us have the sequence ψ 1 ∨ λ, ψ 2 ∨ λ, ψ 3 ∨ λ, . . . . Clearly, the formulas have linear-size proofs in S. It is easy to show that the sequence has only exponential-size proofs in P : for a formula η, let η denote the formula obtained by replacing every occurrence of the variable p in a modal context by 1, and every occurrence of p in a non-modal context by 0 in η. It is easy to see that if η of modal-depth one has a proof in P with n distributivity axioms then η has also a proof in P with n distributivity axioms. But (ψ i ∨ λ) = ψ i ∨ (21 → 0), which is -using no distributivity -equivalent to ψ i . QED
